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In her opening contribution to this symposium, Mary Morgan has
provided a critical evaluation of Marshall's Tendencies in which she
reviews a series of methodological issues. She characterizes my views
quite accurately, while pinpointing the gaps in my account (most notably
in relation to pinning down what is meant by a `mechanism'). I am
therefore going to leave this aspect of things on one side, and turn to
other matters.2 In order to focus attention on those issues which are
relevant to my main theme, I would like to begin by pulling out the
book's main argument in a series of assertions:
The point of departure. In many situations that economists set out to
analyse, a number of factors that exert large and systematic influences on
outcomes may be difficult to identify, let alone to measure, proxy or control
1 I would like to take the opportunity to draw attention to two misprints in Marshall's
Tendencies (which have been corrected in the current reprinting). On page 80, final
paragraph, line 3: for `profit' read `gross profit'. On page 97, line 18, for `is offset by' read
`lies in'.
2 There is, however, one point of terminology on which I would like to remark. Professor
Renault dislikes the use of the term `true model'; as a matter of general usage, I share his
dislike, and favour the econometrician's language of a `preferred specification'. My reason
for using the phrase `true model' in Marshall's Tendencies is that my focus of interest lies
in the standard paradigm, as interpreted by reference to the analogy of the tides. Here, the
idea is that the data we observe is driven by some deterministic model which incorporates
all large and systematic influences on outcomes, together with a small random noise term
± and that we can uncover this underlying model from the data. It is relative to a
discussion of this story and the inadequacies of this story, that I find it appropriate to
speak of attempts to identify the `true model'.
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for. This may happen because some factors are intrinsically hard to observe
(the beliefs of agents, say), others are lost in the mists of history (the
various patterns of entry to different industries within a dataset, say),
while yet others may come into play only in a sporadic fashion (as, for
example, in the case of shifts in coalition structure within the OPEC cartel).
The presence of such unobservables can make the problem of `model
selection' a hazardous one; and since most tests on theories are carried out
jointly with some `model selection exercise', this may pose a major problem
in regard to testing economic theories.3
This statement, as it stands, is pretty uncontroversial. The question
is, how serious is this problem? Here, views differ widely. At one end of
the spectrum, there are those who think this is a minor issue. On this
view, if our exploration of the dataset leads us to the realization that
some unanticipated factor is playing a role, then we can fix the problem.
If the role of this new factor is sporadic, then it is labelled as being
`outside the model', and its influence is allowed for ex post by sticking in
a dummy variable. If the new factor is one which exerts a continuing
influence on outcomes, but which cannot be measured, we can infer its
role by applying standard techniques. To someone of this view, the
answer lies in extending the standard regression analysis setup by
allowing for the presence of `latent variables'. This is the viewpoint
advocated by Professor Renault in his comment. To Professor Fisher, on
the other hand, the problem is relatively manageable in some areas but
may be deeply problematic in others. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, we find the extreme pessimists, represented by Keynes and
Hayek. Here, the view is that the problem posed by unobservables is not
3 In making this point, I note that most economists, when asked to cite empirically
successful theories or models, tend to come up with two examples: option pricing and
auctions. I point out in Chapter 2 that in these two areas, the model selection problem is
much less severe than in most of the areas we analyse. I also emphasize that the model
selection problem still remains in these areas, and limits what we can do (see pages 45±6
and page 57; all page references relate to Sutton (2000)). Professor Renault argues at length
that the model selection problem is very serious in these two areas. The difference
between our positions on this point lies in a difference of emphasis; indeed, his comment
on auctions is closely similar to my own statement on page 57. As to options, I have
drawn attention in Chapter 2 to the ongoing disagreements as to how we should model
the underlying movement of stock prices; what Professor Renault emphasizes is that these
differences of view bring us beyond a framework in which there is some fixed `volatility'
parameter. More controversially, he argues that `the success of the Black±Scholes theory is
not based on its correspondence with truth but rather on its ability to support economic
decisions . . . No bank would sell an option without software to hedge it'. This raises the
question of whether the popularity of the Black±Scholes model may nowadays affect the
way in which options are priced, and it is for this reason that I chose to focus in Chapter 2
on illustrating the empirical success of Bachelier's model of 1900.
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amenable to any such easy fix, and that the standard econometric
research programme is fatally damaged by such difficulties.
Now what I have been setting out is an intermediate view: I think
this is a serious problem, but I do not believe that this implies that we
should give up on our conventional strategies. I do however believe that
it is worth being open-minded and eclectic in using approaches that go
beyond the standard paradigm when trying to handle such issues. I can
sum up my view in the form of two implications:
The first implication. If my concerns about unobservables are justified,
then it is particularly important to begin any analysis by considering an
appropriately wide set of `candidate models', and placing heavy emphasis
on the idea that both any estimated parameters, and any tests of theories
(carried out in the usual setting of a model selection exercise) should be
taken seriously only if the results are robust, that is, the conclusions do not
rest upon some arbitrary choice of one model specification as against
another, where neither specification can be rejected by reference to the
data.
Again, this statement, as it stands, will be seen by most economists as
uncontroversial. There will, however, be a big difference in emphasis,
depending on where one stands in relation to the spectrum of views
described earlier. Those at the first end of the spectrum will respond that
all is well; we are accustomed to insist on such robustness. Those at the
other extreme will claim that the standard I have just suggested is
desirable, but unattainable.4
The second implication. So if unobservables pose a serious problem, how
can we find some constructive way forward? My claim is this: rather than
work with a fully specified model of the classical kind, it may in some
(rather special) circumstances be more fruitful to begin with a `class of
models' approach. Such an approach involves a search for such empirically
observable implications as follow for all models which share some
common features; in other words, we aim to handle the unobservables by
designing the theory in such a way as to allow us to work round them. One
particular way of implementing a `class of models' approach is represented
by the `bounds approach' set out in Chapter 3; here, the idea is to
characterize the space of (observable) market outcomes, within which any
equilibrium outcome of any of the models in our specified class must lie.
4 My position may to some degree reflect the fact that my field is industrial organization,
where it is common practice to begin by proposing some quite particular oligopoly model,
continue by estimating parameters within this model, and then draw policy conclusions
from these estimated parameters. My point is that such estimates are only as good as the
set of (unstated) assumptions implicit in the original choice of model specification. Unless
alternative models of equal prior plausibility are estimated, we are not in a position to
draw any confident conclusions as to the way in which a change in some exogenous
(`policy') variable will affect outcomes.
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Let me begin by stating at once that, pace Professor Renault, I do not
claim that this is a good approach in general; rather I emphasize the very
special character of the `market structure' problem which makes it
possible to implement this line of attack by specifying a bound in the
space of observable outcomes, (see my discussion on page 85). In the
same spirit, I do not believe, pace Professor Renault, that this particular
way of relaxing the standard paradigm is the only way, or even the best
way, to do the job. I am quite open to arguments in favour of any
constructive approach, including the one which Professor Renault
himself advocates in his contribution. What I am insisting upon is that it
is important to be open to any constructive way forward that can help us
deal with the problems posed by unobservables: in different contexts,
different methods will be appropriate. It is exactly at this point that we
arrive at the first of my three targets.
The first target. What views am I arguing against? My first target is the
one I have heard expressed most frequently when proposing the bounds
approach to market structure; it runs as follows: `the only ``proper'' kind of
model is a fully specified model of the classical kind'.
This, from a scientific viewpoint, is a rather curious view. The fact that it
is widely held among economists is a rather striking illustration of just
how tight a grip the standard paradigm has obtained over the past fifty
years. Of course, it should be said at once that not all economists feel like
this. Rather, there is a broad range of views, running from this very
narrow orthodoxy at one end, to the extreme openness exemplified by
Professor Christ at the other. To Professor Christ, the `class of models'
approach does not even lie outside the standard paradigm. He likes to
think of the class of models as being a kind of supermodel within which
we embed all the constituent models. Now this is almost true; it would
be exactly true if we could reduce all the differences between models
within the set to some unobserved parameters, so that we could move
across the models by simply shifting the values of these unobserved
parameters. Now this is indeed sometimes possible, though in the
market structure examples I consider in Chapter 3, for instance, it is not
practicable to do this. The two unobservables that matter in these
problems are the form of price competition and the nature of the entry
process. For the former, it is indeed possible to find a suitable
parameterization which brings us from Bertrand competition at one end,
to joint profit maximization at the other (Symeonides, 2001), but there is
no way of classifying, ordering or ranking the huge variety of entry
models that we might consider, so this strategy just does not work here.
The only way to handle things is by formulating the theory in terms of a
set of constraints that must be satisfied by any equilibrium of any model
of our class. All in all, notwithstanding these difficulties, I am very
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sympathetic to Professor Christ's interpretation, and if all economists
shared his view, I would have little to argue about.
My problem lies with those economists who occupy the opposite
end of this spectrum. Here the usual line of criticism, which is stated by
Professor Renault, goes like this: the partial constraints placed on the
space of outcomes by reference to a class of models are not tight enough
to allow us to answer many of the questions we may wish to ask about
the possible impact of exogenous variables on outcomes. This view
appears to be held by many economists, and I believe it is seriously
misplaced for two reasons: First, it misses the central point about the
bounds approach, which is that this approach is not intended as a rival
alternative to the programme of looking for a complete model of the
classical kind. Rather, it is complementary to such an approach. The best
way to see the complementarity between the two approaches is to think
in terms of a hierarchy of assumptions. We begin with a couple of
assumptions which we can expect to hold good across the general run of
industries. Using these assumptions alone, we arrive at some limited
restrictions on the space of outcomes. These restrictions can be tested
directly by reference to a broad cross-section of industries. This is the
`bounds approach'. We now move to the next set of assumptions. Here,
we are dealing with assumptions which would be valid for some
industries, or sets of industries, but not others. By adding these
assumptions to our earlier set, we may hope to narrow the set of
outcomes further, but in the process we also have to narrow the domain
of application of our model. In principle, we could keep adding
assumptions until we had a fully specified model of the classical kind
which was appropriate to some specific industry which we wish to
analyse. This brings us to the `single industry approach' which became
popular in the industrial organization area from the early 1980s
onwards, and which is nowadays often described by the label `structural
estimation'. Now my point of view on this, which is spelt out on page 85,
is that it is sometimes possible to go beyond the bounds approach in the
direction I have indicated, but the trade-off between getting tighter
predictions while narrowing the domain of application may be a pretty
unattractive one. By the same token, it is possible to begin at the other
end of the spectrum by synthesizing the body of single industry studies
as they accumulate, with a view to exploring whether some further
assumptions might be valid for some interestingly wide set of industries.
In this way, we might hope to widen the domain of applications, at the
cost of some loss in the precision of predictions.5
Apart from this issue of complementarity, there is a second reason
5 This is the route that Professor Renault indicates as a way of finding a bridge between the
bounds approach and the latent variable approach ± but see footnote 6 below.
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why I feel that this kind of criticism is misplaced. The central point that
gets overlooked in abstract discussions of this point is that the
characterization offered by the bounds approach to market structure is
sufficient to generate testable predictions which provide clear evidence
that certain basic competitive mechanisms are in operation across the
general run of industries. These mechanisms delimit the set of market
outcomes in a particular way, and are robust enough to override the
influence of the many omitted factors that vary from one industry to
another: it is precisely because they show this robustness that these
mechanisms are of practical interest from a policy standpoint. For it is
only very robust mechanisms of this kind that we can count on to come
into play when we are trying to forecast the likely impact of exogenous
changes to the general run of markets as a result of some future changes
in the external environment. If, for example, we want to ask about the
impact of globalization on industrial development it is crucial to try to
isolate those few strong competitive mechanisms that are going to play a
strong and systematic role across the general run of industries (for a
discussion of this point, see for example Sutton, 2001).
I suspect that one reason for the disagreement on this issue is that
some economists, when they think of policy issues, tend to think in
terms of a policy specific to a single market, and they have in mind their
wish to know the parameter values of some fully specified model of that
market. However, most economic policies are designed to provide an
environment within which a whole run of quite disparate industries will
operate: when thinking about this latter context the issue of robustness is
central, and the focus should be on trying to isolate those few
competitive mechanisms that are likely to operate in a systematic and
predictable way across the general run of industries.
Two more targets: the pessimists. My two remaining targets are related,
in that both have emerged in the wake of disappointments in respect of
what was taken for granted as the proper goal of economic research in the
1960s: the development of a set of theoretical models, which would rest on
a small number of well-motivated assumptions, and which would place
clear and testable restrictions on the space of observable outcomes. Among
some (but by no means all) theorists, this pessimism manifests itself in a
retreat to the position espoused by Robbins. Among applied economists
the same pessimism manifests itself in the view that all we can expect from
theory is a catalogue of candidate models which we can use as a
framework within which we can conduct some model selection exercises.
The position taken up by Robbins was that we can hope, on the basis of
introspection, to come up with a set of assumptions on which we can
build a theory which we can hope to apply with confidence, even though
it has not been directly tested. Here, my claim is simple: no theory
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should be taken seriously until it has been developed to the point where
it yields a set of clear testable implications, and until the empirical
success of its predictions has been confirmed by independent re-
searchers. Any slipping back from this standard leaves us with a body of
analysis founded on a priori judgements ± and so on nothing more than
an argument from authority.
As to the `theory as a framework' view, I would hope that, whether
we start with some a priori assumptions, or develop a theory following
some toing and froing between modelling and data fitting, we could
arrive at a body of theory whose assumptions are well justified, at least
as first order approximations, and whose content lies in a set of
restrictions on the space of observable outcomes. This is certainly
possible in some areas of the subject, and perhaps in many. If theorists
can do no more than provide a framework for parameter estimation,
then economic theory is a poor kind of thing.6
So is my view optimistic or pessimistic? It is clear from Professor
Hoover's comments that he wants very much to classify me somewhere
on this spectrum (and probably as a rather confused pessimist). In fact,
my stance is a cautious and qualified optimism: I believe that the only
target worth aiming for is a body of theory that is well-founded
empirically; I believe that this is a hard objective to achieve, but that at
least in some areas of the subject it is achievable. In aiming at such an
objective, we need to be open-minded and eclectic in respect of research
methods, and we need to be ready to abandon a priori views as to the
putative importance of any mechanism, where the evidence points to its
6 It is at this point, I suspect, that the real difference between my position and Professor
Renault's lies. The bounds approach to market structure, and the latent variable approach
favoured by Professor Renault, are ± as we both remark ± essentially equivalent `ways out'
of Edgeworth's problem of `indeterminacy'. The key issue is this: by accounting for
observed outcomes by reference to latent variables, we might in principle allow ourselves
enough leeway to reconcile any set of observations with a preferred underlying theory.
This tension is particularly evident in the rational expectations macroeconomics literature,
which I discuss at length in Chapter 4. Professor Renault's closing remarks suggest that, in
this debate, he is sympathetic to the school of thought which favours imposing rational
expectations as a maintained assumption. In Chapter 4, I argue for the importance of
having competing schools of thought, so that the R.E. programme per se remains open to
challenge.
It may be helpful, in the light of this point, to return to the `latent variable'
interpretation of the bounds approach to market structure (footnote 5). The key feature of
this approach is that it begins by confining the `unobservables' incorporated in the theory
(and so the candidate `latent variables') to two variables that are known to be both
important and notoriously hard to measure, proxy or control for, viz., the entry process
and the form of price competition. We can then find a bound, relative to which the effects
of our unobservables all operate in the same direction. This is the key to retaining a
testable theory: we can reject the theory if we can show that the restrictions imposed by
the properties of these bounds are violated.
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irrelevance. We are all too susceptible, as a profession, to the lure of a
beautiful theory; but nothing better characterizes a scientific discipline
than the abandonment of a beautiful theory in the face of an ugly fact.
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